Why imported cyber defense systems fail?

In the wake of unprecedented cyber and electronic attacks targeting critical global infrastructure, a crucial question arises: can traditional, imported solutions withstand this new wave? What is happening in electronic security and its related domains is a fundamental transformation.

In modern asymmetric warfare, there is no need for massive troop deployments; it is enough to manipulate a power grid to paralyze a nation’s critical infrastructure. Modern wars are silent and invisible. Cyber and electronic attacks are no longer just about data theft—they are tools to create political, economic, and security instability at the national level. We are entering an era where control over digital codes is more important than control over territory.

Yet, faced with such threats, many countries turn to purchasing foreign defense systems. Is this an effective strategy? The answer is complex—and critically important.

Relying on ready-made technologies is a form of dependency that, in cyber defense, amounts to soft suicide. No major power sells its true defense capabilities to another. These systems inevitably contain backdoors, or at minimum, their architecture is designed for a threat environment different from that faced by the importing country. Cyber defense patterns must be native and unique—like human genetics.

Here, flexibility and localization of electronic defense become essential. Flexibility means moving beyond mere “blocking” models. Our defense system must have rapid recovery capabilities and the ability to adapt instantly to unknown threats. This can be achieved through several approaches:

• Modular architecture: allowing rapid replacement of damaged components.
• Defensive artificial intelligence: to detect abnormal behaviors before they escalate into attacks.
• Integration of electronic and cyber defense: these two fields are now inseparable. Disrupting radio waves (electronics) can provide an entry point to command networks (cyber). They must be managed under a unified system.

At the same time, this does not imply disengaging from global electronic affairs. Cyber diplomacy remains essential. Sharing information on common viruses or high-level security standards can be beneficial—but such cooperation must never replace self-reliance in core defense structures. Nations must engage internationally while ensuring that the “brain” of their defense systems remains entirely under national control.

In electronic security, the absolute priority must be investment in domestic human resources and foundational research. Cyber defense is not merely a technical project; it is a national security strategy that must be integrated across all governmental structures. Countries that learn this lesson will not only withstand future battles—they will dominate them. The last bastion of national sovereignty lies deep within our digital networks.