Power, paranoia, and collapse inside Israel’s spy network

The year 2025 has emerged as an unprecedented and highly turbulent year for the Israeli regime. It is now grappling with a complex crisis that has domestic, regional, and international dimensions.

Following the Gaza war and the historic Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the Israeli regime has been confronted with challenges that are no longer predictable or controllable.

More than two years after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the Gaza war, the Israeli regime is now facing an unprecedented institutional conflict, one that is most visibly reflected within its intelligence bodies such as the Mossad (the regime’s foreign intelligence service), the Shin Bet (internal security service), and other intelligence agencies.

In one such case, for the first time in the regime’s 77-year history, the cabinet voted to dismiss the head of a secret service. In the wake of this unprecedented move, Ronen Bar, the ousted director, while still formally in office, publicly leveled serious accusations against a sitting cabinet official.

Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister of the Israeli regime, openly defied a Supreme Court ruling declaring the dismissal illegal and attempted to push through his preferred candidate— a military officer with close ties to Netanyahu’s inner circle and with no background in intelligence or law enforcement.

This open confrontation is particularly significant given the central role of the Shin Bet in the Israeli regime’s war activities in Gaza.

But why would a cabinet—especially during wartime—move to weaken its own security and intelligence institutions? The answer to this question extends far beyond the case of the Israeli regime alone.

Netanyahu’s dispute with the head of the Shin Bet revolves around several urgent issues. First, who bears responsibility on behalf of the Israeli regime for the failure of October 7—politicians or intelligence officers?

This debate over responsibility also involves differing approaches to what accountability means in the face of failure.

Second, the conflict includes a more theoretical dispute over whether (and to what extent) the prime minister of the Israeli regime can use the regime’s security and intelligence institutions, such as the Shin Bet, for personal or political purposes.

However, the institutional discord in the occupied territories does not end with the Shin Bet. Following a report by Hebrew-language Channel 13 revealing a lengthy meeting between Roman Gofman and Sara Netanyahu just days before Gofman’s appointment as head of the Mossad was announced, a political and security storm has been brewing in the occupied territories.

This revelation, reported by the newspaper Maariv, has triggered extensive internal scrutiny within the Israeli regime’s security establishment.

Gofman, who currently serves as Netanyahu’s military secretary, is scheduled to assume the leadership of the Mossad in June 2026.

The appointment of Gofman—only the second Mossad chief in history to be selected from outside the agency—was welcomed by the ruling coalition. Nevertheless, sources inside the Mossad, particularly in light of ongoing internal investigations, have expressed dissatisfaction.

These confrontations have laid bare even deeper fractures within the occupied territories. Many have reacted with concern, saying this signals an unprecedented attempt to overstep the authority of the internal intelligence agency.

As the conflict between the Israeli regime and the Palestinians continues, questions have intensified regarding the failures of the Israeli intelligence services. Yaakov Amidror, former national security adviser to the Israeli regime, stated: “This is a major failure. This operation essentially proves that the (intelligence) capabilities were not good.”

The Israeli regime has three main branches of intelligence: Aman, Mossad, and Shin Bet. Aman is military intelligence, Mossad is the foreign intelligence service, and Shin Bet is responsible for internal security.

Aman, known as the Military Intelligence Directorate, is tasked with providing intelligence that enables the cabinet to keep the Israeli regime secure.

This unit compiles daily intelligence reports for the prime minister and the cabinet, assesses the likelihood of war, intercepts communications, and manages cross-border operations.

According to Newsweek, after suffering a stunning defeat following Hamas’s surprise attack, the Israeli regime’s intelligence services have sought to restore their credibility through a wave of covert wartime operations.

The debate over responsibility for failing to detect Operation Al-Aqsa Flood continues in the occupied territories, with blame being directed at various intelligence, military, and political officials—including Benjamin Netanyahu—and a number of individuals have resigned from their positions.