Netanyahu’s fear of establishing the October 7 Committee

Hamas’s surprise operation on October 7, 2023 (Operation Al-Aqsa Flood) is not only considered the greatest security failure of the Israeli regime in recent decades, but it has also produced deep political and military repercussions that have shaken the command structure and ruling political coalition in Tel Aviv. The direct aftermath of October 7 quickly became evident within the Israeli War Forces. These disciplinary measures not only confirmed the existence of serious flaws in the security apparatus but also appeared to be an attempt to project responsibility within a complex command system.

Following the attack, a wave of changes swept through senior Israeli generals. Numerous reports indicate that these changes came after an internal assessment that explicitly pointed to “systematic failures” and “chronic organizational and structural deficiencies” in the security institutions responsible for predicting and preventing the attack.

Three senior generals were directly affected and removed by order of the Army Chief of Staff. They included:

• The former head of Military Intelligence (Aman): Responsible for intelligence gathering and threat assessment; the intelligence failure at high levels was a central point of criticism.
• The former head of Operations: This division oversees planning and executing military operations; its inability to respond quickly and coordinate operational units was widely questioned.
• The former commander of the Southern Command: The region responsible for Gaza. It was the main battlefield, and the commander faced severe criticism for failing to detect warning signs and prepare adequate defenses.

It is important to note that these generals had either already resigned or completed their active service, yet their formal dismissal and stripping of authority served as symbolic disciplinary action within the command hierarchy. Although these moves outwardly signaled accountability among military leaders, they represent only one small part of a larger political crisis.

Netanyahu is terrified

While the army conducts internal purges and imposes discipline on lower and mid-level officers, Netanyahu’s cabinet vehemently opposes the formation of an independent national investigation committee with broad powers to examine the political dimensions of the failure.

The main reason for this resistance is fear of the potential consequences and breadth of authority such a committee would hold. A fully empowered investigative body—including access to classified documents and the ability to summon senior political officials—could swiftly dismantle Netanyahu’s defensive narrative.

One of the central hypotheses an independent committee would likely investigate is the government’s strategic miscalculation:

Netanyahu, in the years leading up to October 7, focused the bulk of his political, military, and diplomatic energy on expanding settlements and managing the crisis in the West Bank, rather than addressing the escalating threat posed by Hamas in Gaza. This misplaced focus resulted in a form of “strategic neglect and decentralization” regarding the Gaza Strip.

In this framework, Netanyahu is viewed not only as prime minister but also as the official responsible for national security—someone directly influencing key security decisions—and therefore the primary political figure blamed for the failures. Unofficial reports suggest that warning intelligence from agencies such as Shin Bet and Military Intelligence was ignored due to the Netanyahu cabinet’s overconfidence in deterrence capabilities or because domestic political priorities were placed above national security.

If an independent committee were to confirm this and provide evidence that Netanyahu’s political decisions undermined Gaza-front preparedness, the consequences would far exceed military reprimands.

Netanyahu’s strategy toward blocking the October 7 inquiry committee

Netanyahu’s cabinet has adopted a clear strategy: delay the formation of the investigative committee until after the Gaza war ends.

Their official justification is that the regime must focus on military operations during wartime and that internal investigations could weaken morale and empower enemies. However, the true purpose of this strategy is to buy time and use any military gains as a political shield.

But existing evidence shows that Netanyahu has failed to achieve any of his three declared goals in the Gaza war:

• “Destroying Hamas,”
• “Full occupation of the Gaza Strip,”
• “Freeing Israeli captives without conceding to Palestinian resistance.”

In reality, Netanyahu and his far-right allies like Ben-Gvir and Smotrich have lost both the substance and the narrative of the conflict.

Netanyahu hopes that by claiming false or exaggerated “victories” (such as the supposed destruction of Hamas), he can persuade part of the public that despite the initial failure, he ultimately achieved strategic success. Another part of his strategy is controlling the inquiry itself. By delaying the process, the government aims to shape the committee’s authority and membership after the war in a way that ensures the final conclusions remain manageable and focus on operational, not political, failures.

Conclusion

The dismissal of the three senior generals is an attempt to quickly close the military chapter and show a responsive reaction, but the root of the crisis lies at the top of the power pyramid. Benjamin Netanyahu is deeply afraid of an independent national investigative committee because such a body could show that his strategic focus on the West Bank—and his neglect of the Gaza threat—was the main factor behind the security gaps that led to the events of October 7.

His ongoing opposition to full transparency indicates that Netanyahu’s political survival depends on preventing the truth about the greatest security failure in the history of the Israeli occupation regime from fully emerging.

Early internal reviews have already shown that the failures of October 7 were far more than an intelligence lapse—they reflected deep structural problems. Netanyahu’s position at the center of Tel Aviv’s political and executive decision-making played a direct role in creating, entrenching, and amplifying this breakdown.