Legal analysis of the U.S. and Israeli aggression against Iran’s protected nuclear facilities

According to experts, the joint assault by Israel and the U.S. in June 2025 sparked serious concerns over the security of internationally monitored nuclear facilities. These attacks disrupted operations at facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and were justified by the aggressors as “preventive action.”

The Strategic Vision think tank wrote that such acts undermined international law and the delicate regime of nuclear safety and security. As the dust settles, the world must ask: if protected nuclear facilities can be targeted, what remains of the global commitment to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy? These attacks should prompt urgent reflection and reforms to safeguard nuclear infrastructure and national sovereignty.

The military aggression began on June 13, when Israel launched a wave of drone and missile strikes against Natanz. A few days later, U.S. forces joined in the assault on Iran’s nuclear sites.

International law is clear: Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iranian territory plainly violated this principle. Neither state credibly invoked Article 51 of the Charter, which allows self-defense only in the event of an armed attack. The claim that Iran posed an imminent threat remains unfounded—especially given that no effort to develop nuclear weapons has been confirmed by the IAEA or any impartial body.

International humanitarian law (IHL) further complicates the legality of these actions. Article 56 of Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibits attacks on “works or installations containing dangerous forces,” including nuclear power plants, where such attacks could cause severe civilian casualties. This protection applies not only to operating nuclear reactors but also to enrichment facilities, where the release of chemicals or radiological materials could pose grave public health risks. The damage inflicted on Natanz and Isfahan clearly falls under this protective framework.

Historical precedent reinforces the illegality of such strikes. U.N. Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) affirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear facilities and called for respect of international law.

Regarding allegations of Iranian non-compliance with NPT safeguards, the legality of the 2025 attacks collapses under closer legal scrutiny. Since joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970, Iran has adhered to its obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), signed in 1974 (INFCIRC/214).

The U.S. and Israeli assaults came despite Iran’s repeated emphasis that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, with no intent to produce nuclear weapons. Israel’s unilateral action, absent evidence of an imminent weaponization effort or international consensus, violated both international law and the legitimacy of the IAEA.

Neither the IAEA nor its resolutions authorize or justify preemptive military strikes by other states. IAEA Board of Governors reports are verification tools—not licenses for war. This aggression, carried out outside U.N. mechanisms and without Security Council consultation, violates international security norms, undermines global stability, and erodes the legal foundation of the non-proliferation regime.

The attacks dealt a severe blow to the fragile global nuclear security system and seriously weakened the authority and credibility of the IAEA, particularly since the matter was never referred to the U.N. Security Council. This sets a dangerous precedent in which certain states, shielded from accountability, can disregard international protocols and act aggressively based on their own claimed assessments. Moreover, it signals that the IAEA cannot be fully trusted to manage proliferation risks—undermining not only its verification mechanisms but the entire security architecture.

While the legal framework for the safety and security of nuclear facilities may appear comprehensive, it is insufficient to prevent such damage. The Strategic Vision report urges swift and decisive action by the international community. Legal instruments protecting civilian nuclear infrastructure must be strengthened. A new multilateral convention, building on Article 56 of Additional Protocol I, should explicitly criminalize attacks on peaceful nuclear sites regardless of the attacker’s motives.

Furthermore, the IAEA must avoid political bias and maintain transparent, law-based decisions for all states. Parties that undermine the agency’s authority must face political and diplomatic accountability.

Experts say that by framing their aggression as “necessary defensive measures,” Israel and the U.S. have blurred the conceptual clarity of what constitutes a legitimate threat. If mere allegations of intent to weaponize nuclear capabilities become a sufficient basis for military action, any country pursuing nuclear technology could be subject to similar treatment—further polarizing international relations.

The U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran’s nuclear facilities marks a turning point for the global governance of nuclear safety, security, and legitimacy. It exposes the fragility of international norms and the risks of military provocations. The world cannot allow such violations to go unanswered. The alternative is a global order in which law is cast aside in favor of brute force.