Gharib Abadi: IAEA report focuses on closed claims for political purposes

In response to the IAEA Director General’s report on Iran, Gharib Abadi issued the following statement:

The IAEA Director General has published a new report on certain safeguards issues related to the Islamic Republic of Iran. I would like to highlight the following points:

First, the Director General refers to the November 2024 resolution as the mandate for this report. Unfortunately, this resolution was politically pushed through by three European countries and the U.S. at the IAEA Board of Governors without consensus, disregarding the outcomes of the Director General’s visit to Iran. Regrettably, the report fails to address this disregard for his mission.

Second, the report focuses on alleged nuclear material from over two decades ago at four claimed sites, based on fabricated data from the Israeli regime. Notably, the report contains no ambiguities regarding Iran’s current nuclear activities or any deviations in nuclear materials or activities. Key points to note: First, all claims related to Iran’s past nuclear program were closed under the November 2015 resolution following the JCPOA. Thus, this report contradicts that resolution and represents a political attempt to revive unproven, misleading claims. Second, the IAEA itself notes that two of the four sites—Lavizan-Shian and the so-called Marivan—are no longer considered outstanding issues. Highlighting these two sites serves only to recycle unproven past claims for new political exploitation against Iran. Third, regarding the other two sites, Varamin and Turquzabad, Iran has provided necessary explanations and documentation, including during two recent visits by the IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards to Tehran.

Iran has no undeclared nuclear activities or materials. Explanations and documents related to these two sites, concerning claims from over two decades ago, have been provided to the IAEA. While all of Iran’s nuclear activities and materials are under IAEA supervision and verification with no deviations observed, amplifying two alleged issues and expressing excessive concern is merely an excuse to create artificial alarm. This is particularly striking given that the Israeli regime, outside all disarmament treaties and armed with weapons of mass destruction, faces no action from the IAEA or claimant countries.

Third, despite the IAEA’s claim that “three sites were part of an undeclared structured nuclear program conducted by Iran until the early 2000s, involving undeclared nuclear materials,” the same report acknowledges that “the IAEA has no credible indications of an ongoing undeclared structured nuclear program in Iran and takes note of statements by Iran’s highest authorities that the use of nuclear weapons is incompatible with Islamic law.” This admission reveals that the IAEA, under political pressure from certain countries, is being used as a tool to reopen closed issues to pressure Iran.

Fourth, the report’s reference to Iran’s 60% enrichment is irrelevant to its mandate. It states: “While enrichment activities under safeguards are not prohibited, the fact that Iran is the only non-nuclear-weapon state producing and stockpiling uranium enriched up to 60% remains a serious concern, drawing international attention due to potential proliferation implications.” It must be emphasized that as long as nuclear activities are under IAEA supervision, there is no cause for concern. There are no restrictions on enrichment levels under IAEA documents, only on diversion to non-peaceful purposes. The Director General has no right or obligation to label a legitimate activity as concerning. This move by Mr. Grossi is entirely political and aligned with certain countries’ interests, for which he must be held accountable.

Fifth, another irrelevant issue raised by Mr. Grossi is the modified Code 3.1. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the failure of the three European countries to fulfill their commitments, Iran, under its Strategic Action Law, suspended nuclear commitments beyond safeguards. Code 3.1, concerning early declaration of nuclear facilities, is not a safeguards obligation, and the IAEA’s insistence on it as such lacks legitimacy.

Sixth, the report claims that “Iran’s revocation of designations of experienced inspectors over recent years has undermined the IAEA’s ability to effectively and efficiently implement safeguards.” However, the IAEA’s 2024 safeguards implementation report states that as of December 31, 2024, 274 inspectors were active in Iran, with 120 in the Iran verification office. Iran’s revocation of designations for inspectors from the three European countries, following their political actions at the Board of Governors, should not be misconstrued as undermining IAEA capacity. Iran naturally lacks confidence in inspectors from these countries, and revoking their designations is a safeguard right. It is regrettable that Mr. Grossi overlooks the work of 120 inspectors from various nationalities and focuses solely on a few from the three European countries.

Seventh, despite the above, the report acknowledges that “Iran continues to cooperate with the IAEA on routine safeguards implementation, and the IAEA conducts extensive verification efforts in Iran commensurate with its nuclear fuel cycle and activities.” The 2024 safeguards implementation report further notes: “Based on its evaluation, the Secretariat concluded that declared nuclear materials in 31 countries, including Iran, remained in peaceful activities.” It also highlights that of 32 countries with safeguards agreements without an Additional Protocol, Iran hosts 21 of 100 nuclear facilities under safeguards, 493 of 682 inspections, 144 of 224 design information verifications, and 1,260 of 1,895 person-days of inspections. Additionally, €22.626 million of the IAEA’s €38.905 million regular budget and €4.3 million of its €28 million voluntary budget were spent in Iran in 2024. This extensive IAEA activity in Iran reflects Iran’s constructive cooperation. The IAEA’s focus on closed past issues, despite finding no deviations in current activities, points to political motives driven by certain countries.

Eighth, throughout the IAEA’s history, we have witnessed numerous political actions. The silence of Western countries, the U.S., and IAEA officials regarding Israel’s actions is a stark example. Meanwhile, cases of two IAEA member states with undeclared enrichment activities were closed without action. Why, then, are the IAEA and certain countries fabricating a case against Iran by reviving unproven, closed claims? The public can judge for itself.

Ninth, finally, Iran neither seeks nuclear weapons nor has undeclared nuclear materials or activities. Iran has adhered to all its commitments thus far. The costs Iran has borne are for preserving its dignity, progress, and resistance against coercion and domination by certain countries. If these countries exploit Iran’s patience and persist in their misguided approach, Iran will be compelled to take appropriate measures based on developments and others’ actions, with responsibility for the consequences falling on those countries.