Palermo: Reservations and National Interests

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), also known as the "Palermo Convention," is a significant multilateral treaty adopted by the United Nations in 2000 to combat transnational organized crime.
The convention is supplemented by three protocols: The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air; and The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition.
These documents encapsulate key elements of international law concerning human trafficking and arms trafficking, with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) responsible for their implementation. The convention came into force on September 29, 2003, and by September 19, 2017, it had been signed by 189 parties, including 184 UN member states, the Cook Islands, the Holy See, Niue, the State of Palestine, and the European Union.
However, nine countries, including Iran, have not fully acceded to the convention, meaning they have signed it but have not ratified it in their parliaments. These countries are Bhutan, the Republic of the Congo, Iran, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tuvalu.
In June 2018, Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly approved a bill to join the UNTOC. The review process, involving the Guardian Council, the Parliament, and ultimately the Expediency Discernment Council, took several years. Eventually, Iran’s accession to the convention was approved with reservations and formally communicated by the Speaker of the Parliament.
The significance of Iran’s accession to the Palermo Convention lies in its direct connection to the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which views the convention as a critical step toward removing Iran from its blacklist and facilitating international financial interactions.
A key question arises: Can Iran join the Palermo Convention with reservations? The answer lies in the rules of international law, particularly the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. According to these rules, countries may declare reservations when acceding to an international treaty, provided these reservations are not incompatible with the treaty’s “object and purpose.”
Iran’s reservations primarily involve specific interpretations of sensitive concepts such as “organized criminal group,” non-recognition of resistance groups as organized crime entities, and opposition to referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.
Such reservations are not unprecedented in international law. For instance, the United States explicitly stated that it would only agree to arbitration or referral to the International Court of Justice with its consent. Similarly, Saudi Arabia conditioned its implementation of the convention on compliance with Islamic Sharia law.
Thus, Iran’s reservations are within the accepted framework of international law as long as they do not hinder the effective implementation of the convention’s core provisions. Provided Iran remains committed to combating organized crime, conditional accession to the Palermo Convention is both legally feasible and legitimate.
However, two critical points should not be overlooked. First, Western countries’ interactions with the Islamic Republic of Iran are often driven by political motives rather than purely legal or technical considerations, which could pose significant obstacles to Iran fully benefiting from membership in such conventions. Second, even if Iran joins the Palermo Convention and the Convention on Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT), the FATF has provided no guarantee of Iran’s immediate removal from its blacklist, consistently emphasizing the need for further steps.
Nevertheless, Iran’s membership in the Palermo Convention is not only legally feasible and legitimate but also strategically beneficial for improving the country’s financial and political interactions on the international stage. The prerequisite is that Iran’s declared reservations must not conflict with the convention’s overarching objectives, and the principles of combating organized crime must be upheld.
Ultimately, Iran’s conditional accession to the convention could provide a valuable opportunity to enhance transparency, strengthen international cooperation, and reduce external economic pressures. However, vigilance is required regarding the bad faith and politicized approaches of certain global actors in this process.